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tunity to defend. There are no statutory grounds provided for vacating
a judgment within the term in which it was rendered. Of course, the
provisions of section 2325.01 of the Ohio Revised Code are available to
the court, but whether a judgment will be vacated within term is largely
a matter within the discretion of the court. When the defendant is at-
tempting to vacate the judgment in a subsequent term of court, the rea-
sons urged upon the court must fall within Ohio Revised Code section
2325.01. Although, if at all possible, the court will assist a defendant
against whom a default judgment has been entered, if the defendant or
his counsel has been negligent in the pursuit of the action, the court will
refuse to offer any aid. If the defendant has had a chance to litigate the
matter, but failed to do so through his own negligence or inattention, he
cannot and should not be able to enlist the court's assistance. Only the
non-negligent defendant to a default judgment is entitled to the court's
special consideration and to the benefits of a motion to vacate such a
judgment under the Ohio statutes.
MYRON L. JOSEPH
The Right to Refuse to Deal
INTRODUCTION
Manufacturers often attempt to fix resale prices in order to prevent
"price cutters" from undermining a product's reputation when sold to the
public below standard retail prices.1 A conflict often arises between this
practice and the spirit of the antitrust laws.2 The Sherman Antitrust Act
declares, generally, that all agreements, combinations, or conspiracies in
restraint of trade are unlawful.' The Federal Trade Commission Act,4
which was enacted to supplement the Sherman Act,5 empowers the Com-
mission to restrain unfair methods of competition. The obvious purpose
of the antitrust laws is to preserve competition so that the buying public
will receive the most for its dollar. In carrying out this purpose, the
Supreme Court has declared that all agreements between a manufacturer
and wholesalers or retailers to fix resale prices are in violation of the
1. This reasoning was used by a manufacturer of eyeglass lenses in one of the leading cases
concerning a manufacturer's right to maintain resale prices through the device of refusing to
sell to all dealers who did not obey resale price stipulations. United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
2. The Attorney General's National Committee to Study Antitrust Laws has condemned all
methods of resale price maintenance as being contrary to the basic tenets of the national
antitrust policy. Report of the Attorney General's Natl Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws
(1955). See Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REV. 175 (1936).
3. 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958)-
4. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 41-58 (1958).
5. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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spirit of the antitrust laws in general and are specifically illegal under the
Sherman Act.6 The Supreme Court reasoned that to allow such price-fix-
ing agreements would be to deny to the public the right to buy from re-
tailers who are free to sell at whatever price they feel will bring them a
just return. Manufacturers agree that the public is entitled to purchase
from retailers who are not bound to sell at a certain price, but deny that
the public has a right to purchase from a retailer who sells below the
average market price:
It is a mere truism to say that the fixing and maintaining by a manu-
facturer of a fair price above cost is not only a right but a commercial
necessity; and any other course must end in bankruptcy. When such
fair prices are departed from, and they are unreasonably raised and
exacted from the purchasing public, the public is prejudiced thereby.
On the other hand, when the price is so unreasonably lowered as to
drive others out of the business, with a view of stifling competition, not
only is that wronged competitor individually injured, but the public is
prejudiced by the stifling of competition.7
Despite this contention, which in practice may well be true, the Su-
preme Court has consistently held to its position that all agreements to fix
resale prices are illegal under the antitrust laws.' The same result is
6. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Trenton Potteries Co. v.
United States, 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See also, Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (conspiracy to effect maximum
resale prices held a violation of the Sherman Act, i.e., agreement to fix prices). The agree-
ments to control resale prices usually take either of two forms: (1) "vertical price-fixing"
agreements, wherein a buyer or seller operating in different markets or at different levels of the
same market agrees that a product is not to be resold below a certain price. The "vertical"
agreements were found to be violations of the Sherman Act as early as 1911 in the Dr. Miles
case, supra; (2) "horizontal price fixing," in which competitors at the same level in the same
market agree to fix resale prices. This latter type agreement dearly violates § 1 of the Sher-
man Act, 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), and the Supreme Court
has so held. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra; Trenton Potteries Co. v. United
States, supra.
7. This contention was made by the New Jersey District Court in the case of United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 223 Fed. 55, 89, (1915), af 'd, 251 U.S. 417 (1918). See also
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915); United States
v. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 322-24 (1896); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. National Whole-
sale Druggists Ass'n, 175 N.Y. 1, 67 N.E. 136 (1903).
8. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Trenton Potteries Co. v.
United States, 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (conspiracy to effect maximum resale prices
held a violation of the Sherman Act, i.e., agreement to fix prices).
9. Trenton Potteries Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Although the Supreme
Court from the case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), to the present
date has interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit contracts, combinations or conspiracies having
unreasonable terms, there are some contracts, agreements or conspiracies which are by their
very nature so unreasonable as to constitute a Sherman Act violation in and of themselves.
Situations falling within the above category are labeled per se violations of the Sherman Act.
One type of per se Sherman Act violation is the contract or agreement by which the parties
attempt to fix the prices at which goods are sold, be it a "horizontal" or "vertical" agreement-.
see cases cited note 8 supra. Concerning the courts' application of the "rule of reason" to
Sherman Act cases, see HANLER, ANMTRUST IN PERSPECTIVE chap. 2 (1957).
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reached even though the prices fixed by such agreements are reasonable
prices,' or when the agreement fails to achieve its stated purpose."°
The manufacturer, however, has two possible ways of controlling re-
sale prices while not specifically agreeing to fix prices. One approach is
to comply with the pertinent state "fair trade laws," and come within the
exemptions from the antitrust laws. These exemptions are set forth in
the Miller-Tydings Act" and the McGuire Act.' The alternative approach
to controlling resale prices is based on the Colgate doctrine established by
the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Colgate & Company in
1919."3 Under this doctrine a manufacturer has the right to specify resale
prices, announce in advance that he will refuse to sell to customers who
fail to maintain the specified prices, and in fact refuse to sell to such cus-
tomers if they fail to comply. The danger the manufacturer faces in at-
tempting to follow the permissive course of the Colgate doctrine is two-
fold. First, the manufacturer in attempting to enforce his "refusal to
deal" policy by informing his customers of the plan and acquiring their
consent to deal with him on such a basis, may be held to have agreed with
them to fix prices and thereby have violated the Sherman Act. 4 Second,
a manufacturer who has refused to deal with a customer, be it a retailer,
wholesaler, or distributor, and has been joined in this refusal to deal with
such a customer by others with whom the manufacturer deals, may be
charged with violation of the Sherman Act. This is due to the concerted
action taken by the manufacturer and his other customers. It is said by
the courts that they are in effect boycotting the dealer who is not willing
10. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940).
11. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). The Miller-Tydings Act was
an amendment to § I of the Sherman Act. It provides, in general, that fair trade contracts,
i.e., vertical price-fixing agreements, legal under state law, are exempt from the federal anti-
trust laws.
12. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958). The usual fair trade
acts provide that agreements between a manufacturer and retailer, fixing the prices at which
the retailer would sell, were not illegal under state law and further that it was unfair competi-
tion for any other retailer, with notice of the existence of the agreement, to sell below the
price specified in the fair trade contract. The clauses in the fair trade acts which bound re-
tailers having notice of the fair trade contract have been referred to as "non-signer clauses."
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384 (1951), held that the exemption created by the Miller-Tydings Act was not as
broad as the state fair trade laws. It specifically struck down all "non-signer clauses" as not
being within the scope of the Miller-Tydings Act. In. response to the Schwagmarm Bros.
case, Congress enacted the McGuire Act as an amendment to § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. The McGuire Act specifically exempted the "non-signer clauses" from the fed-
eral antitrust laws, thereby filling the gap which the Supreme Court opened in the Miller-
Tydings Act. It should be noted that the fair trade exemption of the McGuire Act is not
applicable to any type of horizontal arrangement. For example, if a manufacturer has a fair
trade contract with a wholesaler and the manufacturer also acts as a wholesaler, the agreement
is not within the exemption because it is in effect a "horizontal agreement" between two
wholesalers. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
13. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
14. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); United States v. A. Schrader's Son,
Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
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to accept the manufacturers' terms and are excluding him from trade in
the particular article manufactured. Such concerted refusals to deal or
group boycotts are per se violations of the Sherman Act.'" The confu-
sion arises when a manufacturer's actions can be said to have gone beyond
a simple refusal to deal and yet have not reached the stage of an agree-
ment or "concerted action."
This note will be primarily devoted to a discussion of the law con-
cerning a manufacturer's right to refuse to deal in order to maintain re-
sale prices and the extent to which a manufacturer can proceed with such
a policy in the face of the proscriptions against price-fixing agreements
and concerted refusals to deal. The state "fair trade laws" will not be
discussed.
CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL
In the case of Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v.
United States,16 the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following
language:
An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong when
done by many acting in concert.17
The above quotation typifies the courts' approach to the problem of
concerted refusals to deal, commonly known as group boycotts. Partly due
to an assumption that group action is more effective,'" and partly due to
the explicit terms of the antitrust laws,'9 the emphasis in this area is
shifted from the refusal itself to the agreement or combination.2" The
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association case 2' involved a scheme
15. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945). The Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee has condemned such combinations as a per se violation. Report of the At-
torney General's Nat'l Comm. To Study Antitrust Laws 137 (1955).
16. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
17. Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433, 440 (1910).
18. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1923); United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Criticism of this basis is often
made: "No attempt is made in the case to ascertain the combine's economic strength. A
boycott by a powerful corporation, under the ratio decidendi of the courts, would presumably
be upheld while the combined boycott of several pigmies would be denounced. Although the
presence of a combination invites the application of the conspiracy concept, nevertheless the
element of numbers seems, at best, but an adventitious factor." Handler, Unfair Competition,
21 IOWA L REV. 175, 207-8 (1936). See also Hardy, Loose and Consolidated Combinations
Under the Antitrust Laws, 21 GEo. L.J. 123 (1933).
19. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the -several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared
illegal .... " 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
20. E.g., Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 312 (1923). A combination or
conspiracy can be formed without any specific agreement on the part of the conspirators. Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225, 227 (1939); William Goldman
Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743-5 (3d Cit. 1945).
21. Prior group boycott cases under the Sherman Act include Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193
U.S. 38 (1904); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v
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to deter wholesale lumber dealers from selling directly to customers of
retailers. This scheme was effectuated by distributing to member retail-
ers a list of offending wholesalers. Although the members of the associ-
ation had not expressly agreed to refrain from dealing with the listed
wholesalers and there was no penalty for a failure to do so, it was found
that the natural tendency on the part of retailers receiving the reports was
to refuse to buy from the listed wholesalers. The Court had no problem
in finding a conspiracy to boycott nonconforming wholesalers. It held
that the agreement between members of the association placed involun-
tary restraints on outsiders to the association. The members' actions
amounted to a boycotting of all wholesalers who failed to conform to the
Retail Association's desires. The Court did not doubt that a retail dealer
could stop dealing with a wholesaler for reasons sufficient unto himself,
but when he joined with others to do this, the act became unlawful under
the Sherman Act. This same reasoning has been used in all subsequent
group boycott cases. 2
The case of Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC23 is the first case to
lay down explicitly the modern principle of group boycott, i.e., that it is
prima facie unreasonable for a dominant group to combine to coerce out-
siders to follow a pattern of trade as dictated by the group. In this case
the Supreme Court struck down, as a group boycott, activity on the part
of the Guild to control "style piracy." The Fashion Originators' Guild
sought to destroy competition from manufacturers who pirated designs of
guild members, by refusing to sell to retailers who sold such copied gar-
ments. The scheme operated through the circulation of lists of non-
cooperating retailers to whom no sales were to be made by Guild mem-
bers. In holding the practice unlawful, as constituting a group boycott,
the Court also held that it was not error for the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to refuse to hear much of the evidence offered by the Guild on the
reasonableness of the scheme to protect the trade against the "devastating
evils" growing from the pirating of original designs. The Court held
that the reasonableness of the methods was "no more material than would
be the reasonableness of the prices fixed by unlawful combination."24
United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912). See generally, Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per
Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 (1942); Barber, Refusals to
Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. OF PA. L. REv. 847 (1955).
22. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (agreement not
to lease pictures except under a standard form contract which included a provision for
the arbitration of all disputes under the contract); United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc.,
282 U.S. 44 (1930) (agreement not to lease films to theatres which had changed hands, unless
the new owner assumed the obligations of the former owners to the alistributors or deposited
with the lessor in advance cash security as specified by the distributors); Binderup v. Pathe
Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) (agreements among dominant groups of motion picture
distributors not to supply films to any exhibitor unless he dealt with all the distributors).
23. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
24. Id. at 467-68.
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The strong judicial attitude against group boycott was further exem-
plified by the case of Associated Press v. United States25 and the dicta of
the Supreme Court in the later cases of United States v. Columbia Steel
Company2" and Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United States.27
The Associated Press case involved the legality of the bylaws of the AP,
which placed restrictions on the admission to membership of applicants
serving the same area as any existing member, and other bylaws forbidding
AP members to sell news to nonmembers. A majority of the Supreme
Court agreed with the district court that the AP arrangement resulted in an
unlawful restraint of trade. The Court relied heavily on the group boycott
cases in condemning the AP bylaws which required the membership to
refuse to deal with outsiders. Such bylaws were held to be unlawful re-
gardless of the purpose for which they were designed. In the Columbia
Steel case, the Supreme Court cited the Associated Press case together with
three group boycott cases2" for the proposition that where a complaint
charged that the defendants "have concertedly refused to deal with non-
members of a group... ," then the amount of commerce involved is im-
material because such restraints are illegal per se 9 In the Times-Picayune
case the Court reiterated the proposition that any agreement involving
limitations on the freedom of parties to deal with others was per se un-
lawful when it said, citing the Associated Press case, that "group boycotts,
or concerted refusals to deal clearly run afoul of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
,3 0
The distinguishing feature of the group boycott cases is group action
to coerce third parties to conform to the pattern of conduct desired by
the group or to secure the removal of outsiders from competition.3 The
25. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
26. 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
27. 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953).
28. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FMC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38
(1904).
29. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948).
30. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953). Some
authorities contend that the rule condemning group boycotts as per se violations of the Sherman
Act applies only to cases where there is an element of coercion upon third parties. Barber,
Refusals to Deal Under Antitrust Laws, 103 U. OF PA. L. REv. 847, 879 (1955); Note, Re-
fusals to Sell and Pubik Control of Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1139 (1949). The
above position does not seem sound since the Supreme Court has recently reasserted the rule of
per se illegality of all group boycotts. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959).
31. Evening News Publishing Co. v. Allied Newspaper Carrier of N. J., 263 F.2d 715 (3d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 929 (1959); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958) (group boycotts are among those practices conclusively presumed to be ua-
reasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (concerted refusal to sell to a dealer who did not observe specified
resale prices unlawful per se); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293
(1945); Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
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combination may be either horizonta3 or vertical. m Such action offends
the concept of a free market because it places involuntary restraints on
the trading opportunities of strangers to the group. In holding such
concerted refusals to deal unlawful, the courts have focused on the means
used - the group boycott - noting that the objective of the group itself
may be lawful and the effect of the group action not unlawful if accom-
plished by an individual not acting in concert with others.
INDIVIDUAL REFUSALS TO DEAL
Not only has the Supreme Court struck down group refusals to deal
designed to maintain resale prices,34 but also it has condemned all express
agreements which attempt to control resale prices." The case of Dr.
Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company8 established the
rule that a manufacturer may not, consistently with the Sherman Act, sell
the articles he makes to others and yet by contract with them fix the
price of future sales.
Although a trader may not agree to fix resale prices, there is one
method by which this objective may be lawfully achieved (leaving aside
the statutory methods available in fair trade states). An individual
manufacturer in the exercise of his freedom to trade, may freely refuse to
sell to another the articles he produces, for any reason he pleases, or for
no reason, if he acts alone in the course of a private business which is
free from unlawful monopoly.37 Therefore, a manufacturer has the right
32. Cases cited note 22 supra; KIors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959); see also note 6 supra and accompanying text.
33. Cases cited note 31 supra; Straus v. .Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir.
1924) (refusal by dealers to sell to retailers at other than specified resale prices); United
States v. Waltham Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); see also note 6 supra and
accompanying text.
34. Cases cited note 31 supra.
35. Cases cited note 8 supra.
36. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
37. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915). Recent cases illustrative of further con-
firmation of this principle are: Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954) (dissatisfaction with performance and business methods);
Meyers Motors v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1949) (dissatisfaction
with performance and business methods); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
225 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955) (same); Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.
1946) (to protect goodwill of supplier's product); Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171
F. Supp. 37 (D. Md. 1959) (deficiencies in over-all performance); Miller Motors v. Ford
Motor Co., 149 F. Supp. 790 (D.N.C. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958); Herren
Candy Co. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 153 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Ga. 1957); Whitely v. Foremost
Dairies, 151 F. Supp. 914 (W.D. Ark. 1957); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Institutional Drug Distribs.,
151 F. Supp. 715 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (same); United States v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (protection of existing investment in
distribution facilities); Coca-Cola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 Fed. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916)
(to protect good will of supplier's product).
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to specify resale prices and to announce in advance that he will refuse to
sell to customers who fail to comply with those prices. s
This legally sanctioned method of controlling prices grew out of the
case of United States v. Colgate & Company.39 The Colgate case in-
volved the sufficiency of an indictment which charged the defendant
with engaging in a combination with its dealers to maintain resale prices
specified by Colgate. The dealers were urged to observe the prices on
pain of losing their supply. Dealers were urged to and did report any
sales secured from reported price cutters. Colgate, after investigation
of the price cutters, placed their names on "suspended lists," and then
requested, and received in some cases, promises of future adherence to
stipulated resale prices. The company uniformly refused to deal with
those dealers who did not give the requested assurances. Although the
Supreme Court eight years before Colgate had held price maintenance
agreements unlawful under the Sherman Act,4" and has since held that
the agreement necessary to make out a violation can be inferred from
conduct of the parties,4 the Court sustained the district court's decision
that the indictment failed to allege any contract or agreement between
Colgate and its dealers.
[W]e must conclude that, as interpreted below, the indictment does not
charge Colgate & Company with selling its products to dealers under
agreements which obligated the latter not to resell except at prices fixed
by the company. . . . [T]he act does not restrict the long-recognized
right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the cir-
cumstances under which he will refuse to sell.42 (Emphasis added.)
The federal courts thereby began to apply the law as laid down by the
Supreme Court.43 But, it was not long before the Court began to clarify
its position in the Colgate case.
In United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Incorporated,4 the Court
spelled out the nature of its holding in Colgate. A district court, citing
Colgate, had dismissed an indictment charging that defendants, A. Schra-
38. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Such action must be taken without
any intent to monopolize the particular market.
39. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
40. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
41. Cases cited note 37 supra.
42. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306-7 (1919).
43. Permissible activities under the Colgate doctrine have included the receipt of assurances
from price cutters that they would adhere to fixed prices in the future, the mailing of form
letters to price cutters insisting upon the upholding of retail prices, and the requests to cus-
tomers for information on price cutting through company salesman. Harriet Hubbard Ayer,
Inc. v. FTC, 15 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 759 (1927); American To-
bacco Co. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 543 (1927); Toledo Pipe
Threading Mach. Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1926).
44. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
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der's Son, Incorporated, had entered into contracts for the maintenance
of resale prices.4 The defendant had argued that since resale price
maintenance achieved through a refusal to deal was valid, the same
objective achieved through oral agreement must also be valid. Upon
writ of error the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district
court. The Court held that the Dr. Miles case, which outlawed any agree-
ments by a manufacturer and retailer to fix resale prices, was still sound
law and was not overruled by the Colgate decision. Mr. Justice McReyn-
olds, who wrote the Colgate opinion, distinguished the Colgate case from
the one at bar:
[There is an] obvious difference between the situation presented when
a manufacturer merely indicates his wishes concerning prices and de-
dines further dealings with all who fail to observe them, and one where
he enters into agreements - whether express or implied from a course of
dealing or other circumstances - with all customers throughout the differ-
ent states, which undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices.
In the first, the manufacturer but exercises his independent discretion
concerning his customers, and there is no contract or combination which
inposes any limitation on the purchaser. In the second, the parties
are combined through agreements designed to take away dealers' control
of their own affairs, and thereby destroy competition and restrain the
free and natural flow of trade amongst the states.46 (Emphasis added.)
The Schrader case therefore established first, that the rule of the
Miles case, i.e., all agreements to fix resale prices are unlawful, is not
modified or limited as a result of the Colgate case; and second, that
unlawful contracts or agreements to fix resale prices may be either express
or implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances.
The Supreme Court by clarifying the position taken in Colgate again
placed emphasis on the means used by manufacturers, in achieving resale
price maintenance, in determining whether a violation of the Sherman
Act has occurred. If a manufacturer achieves resale price fixing by the
threat of refusing to deal, his action is lawful (Colgate)." On the other
hand, if he agrees, either expressly or impliedly, with his customers on a
fixed resale price, he has violated the antitrust laws (Dr. Miles).4" Yet,
there is no difference as far as the public is concerned; it buys an article
at a fixed price. As far as the retailer is concerned, the discretion he
can exercise as to the resale price of the article he owns has been limited -
in one case by fear of not being able to deal in the article again, and in
the other case because he expressly agreed to limit his discretion as to
resale price.
The legal reasoning in the Schrader case was continued in the case of
45. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 Fed. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1919).
46. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1920).
47. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
48. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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Frey & Son, Incorporated v. Cudahy Packing Company.49 In that case,
Frey & Son, Incorporated, a wholesale grocer, brought a civil suit under
the Sherman Act5" because of injuries claimed to have been sustained in
its business by reason of an alleged combination or agreement between
the defendant and wholesale dealers in one of defendant's products, "Old
Dutch Cleanser," to maintain resale prices fixed by the defendant.5 The
case was submitted to the jury to determine whether a combination or
agreement in fact existed. A jury verdict for the plaintiff52 was reversed
by the court of appeals" on the ground that the defendant's actions fell
within the permissive area of refusal to deal as laid down by the Colgate
case. The Supreme Court in affirming the court of appeals held that the
trial court had not erred in sending the case to the jury, but rather in
issuing the following instructions:
[I]f you shall find that defendant indicated a sales plan to the whole-
salers and jobbers, which plan fixed the price below which the whole-
salers and jobbers were not to sell to retailers, and you find de-
fendant called this particular feature of this plan to their attention on
very many different occasions, and you find the great majority of
them not only expressing no dissent from such plan, but actually co-
operating in carrying it out by themselves selling at the prices named,
you may reasonably find... an agreement or combination forbidden by
the Sherman Anti-trust Act.54 (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court ruled that the above findings, standing alone, would
not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, i.e., agreement to fix
prices. It would therefore follow that something more than uniform
prices achieved through a "refusal to deal" plan is necessary for the manu-
facturer's conduct to be considered an agreement to fix prices in violation
of the Sherman Act. The Frey & Son case left unanswered the question
of what activities by a manufacturer are necessary before his "refusal to
deal" program is considered an agreement to fix prices in violation of the
Sherman Act, when such program achieves fixed resale prices.
In the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Com-
pany,55 the Court attempted to spell out the conduct which, in addition
to refusal to deal, would constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. The
Beech-Nut case was decided under the Federal Trade Commission Act,"
which outlaws unfair trade practices. Its decision is helpful in the Sher-
man Act area because the Sherman Act cases have been held to be guides
49. 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
51. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
52. 243 Fed. 205 (D. Md. 1917).
53. 261 Fed. 65 (4th Cir. 1919).
54. 256 U.S. 208, 210 (1921) (charge not printed in opinions below).
55. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
56. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
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to what constitutes a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.5" In that case, the defendant, Beech-Nut Packing Company,
enforced its resale price maintenance plan by refusing to deal with all
distributors who did not observe suggested resale prices. Among the
steps taken by Beech-Nut, in addition to its announced refusal to deal
policy, were:"
(1) Use of agents, distributors and customers to report price-cutting
dealers;
(2) Reinstatement of those offending dealers who promised to ob-
serve the suggested prices;
(3) Numbering of its products so as to trace an underpriced prod-
uct back to its seller;
(4) Listing of price cutters who were not to be sold to by all other
dealers and circulating these lists among all its customers; and
(5) Soliciting wholesalers' help in preventing the listed price cut-
ters from obtaining Beech-Nut products.
In condemning the Beech-Nut policy the Court stated:
The facts found show that the Beech-Nut system goes far beyond the
simple refusal to sell goods to persons who will not sell at stated prices,
which, in the Colgate case, was held to be within the legal right of the
producer .... The system here disclosed necessarily... restrains the natural
flow of commerce .... From this course of conduct a court may infer,
indeed, cannot escape the conclusion, that competition among retail
distributors is practically suppressed, for all who would deal in the com-
pany's products are constrained to sell at the suggested prices.59 (Em-
phasis added.)
The Court found that there existed an agreement between Beech-Nut and
its distributors through the following reasoning:
Nor is the inference overcome by the conclusion stated in the com-
mission's findings that the merchandising conduct of the company does
not constitute a contract or contracts whereby resale prices are fixed,
maintained, or enforced. The specific facts found show suppression of
the freedom of competition by methods in which the company secures
the co-operation of its distributors and customers, which are quite as
effectual as agreements, express or implied, intended to accomplish
the same purpose. By these methods the company, although selling
its products at prices satisfactory to it, is enabled to prevent competition
in their subsequent disposition by preventing all who do not sell at
resale prices fixed by it from obtaining its goods.60 (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court in effect reversed its ruling on the charge in the
Frey & Son case by now holding that if the methods used by a manu-
57. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FrC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
58. FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441,443-44 (1922).
59. Id. at 454-55.
60. Id. at 455.
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facturer, plus a "refusal to deal" program, are as effectual as actual agree-
ments would be in achieving fixed resale prices, then the agreement, es-
sential for a violation of the Sherman Act, can be inferred.' The Court
required proof of sufficient facts to allow it to draw the inference of an
agreement despite the government allegation of a combination to fix
prices. In subsequent criminal and civil cases the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts have often used the rationale of the Beech-Nut
case to strike down any refusal to deal program whenever fixed resale
prices were the result of such a program. 2 These results have been
achieved despite the defense by the manufacturers that their actions fall
within the permissive area of the Colgate doctrine, i.e., an announced
plan of refusing to sell to all those who do not observe suggested resale
prices.
The judicial trend narrowing the Colgate doctrine continued in the
case of United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Company.6" A sales
plan with the objective of obtaining uniform resale prices was initiated by
the defendant, a distributor of eyeglass lenses. The plan not only included
threats of refusing to deal with nonconforming wholesalers and retailers
and an investigatory system to detect price cutters, but also a scheme
whereby the defendant carefully selected and licensed his wholesalers
and retailers. The plan successfully achieved a uniformity of resale
prices which conformed with the suggested price list distributed to all
dealers by the defendant. After selecting his retailers, the defendant-
distributor enforced his retail price maintenance policy by notifying his
wholesalers of any retail price cutters. A wholesaler that continued to
sell to a price cutter after receiving notification was excluded from re-
ceiving the distributor's product.
The trial court found that the distributor had combined and conspired
with wholesalers to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act." In
affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court acknowledged the continu-
ing validity of the Colgate doctrine. The Court noted, however, that in
61. 257 U.S. 441,455 (1922). Mr. Justice McReynolds, the author of the Colgate, Schrader's
and Cudahy decisions, dissented in the Beech-Nut case, saying that the manufactureres conduct
in that case amounted to nothing more than an exercise of his rights under the Colgate case.
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 450-59 (1922) (dissenting opinion).
62. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 129 F.2d 651 (2d Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 664 (1942); Shakespeare Co. v. FTC, 50 F.2d 758 (6th Cir.
1931); Q.R.S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926); Moir v. FTC, 12 F.2d 22
(1st Cir. 1926); Hills Bros. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 662
(1926); Cream of Wheat Co. v. FTC, 14 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1926); Toledo Pipe Threading
Mach. Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337 (6th Cit. 1926). But cf. Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. FTC,
15 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 759 (1927); American Tobacco Co. v.
FTC, 9 F.2d 570 (2d Cit. 1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 543 (1927); United States v. Hudnut, 8
F.2d 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
63. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
64. 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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the case at bar, there was more than mere acquiescence by the whole-
salers in the distributor's resale price list because of their fear of being
cut off by the distributor in accord with its refusal to deal policy. The
Court said that the acceptance by the wholesalers of the price maintenance
plan by cooperating in selling at the suggested prices and by limiting
sales to approved retailers was sufficient to constitute an agreement to fix
prices in violation of the law. It would seem that the Court was holding
true to its reasoning in the Beech-Nut case, ie., that a refusal to deal in
order to maintain resale prices plus some other activity which results in
uniform resale prices is equivalent to an agreement to fix prices.
Whether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by agreement or
by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with assistance in effectuat-
ing its purpose is immaterial 5
From the above statement the inescapable conclusion must be that ac-
quiescence plus assistance on the part of wholesalers in maintaining re-
sale prices under threat of refusal to deal by the supplier, raises the infer-
ence of an agreement. This conclusion is logical since in the case which
the Court had before it, a violation of the Sherman Act was found in
that there was a combination to fix prices. Although a combination to
fix prices was the finding, the Court required the government to estab-
lish sufficient facts which would allow the Court to draw the inference
of an agreement to fix prices."e For support of its decision the Court
cited cases in which it had held that all agreements, express or implied,
to fix resale prices are unlawful.t
THE PARKE, DAvis CASE
The rationale of the Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb cases was carried
one step further in the case of United States v. Parke, Davis & Com-
pany."8 In that case the Court held that the finding of an agreement,
express or implied, to fix resale prices was not necessary to establish a
violation of the Sherman Act when the defendant had been charged with
combining with others to fix resale prices. Parke, Davis Company, a
large manufacturer and distributor of pharmaceutical products, announced
that it would refuse to deal with all retailers who failed to resell its prod-
ucts at suggested prices. It also informed its distributors (wholesalers)
that if they dealt with a retailer who had not observed the suggested
65. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944).
66. Ibd.
67. 321 U.S. at 720. It has been suggested that the Court in the Bausch & Lomb case
did not explain whether it meant that acquiescence coupled with assistance was sufficient to
cause the inference of an agreement, or that there was no need to show an agreement in order
to prove a Sherman Act violation. Note, Resale Price Maintenance and The Parke, Davis Case,
46 VA. L REV. 976, 986 (1960).
68. 362 U.S. 29 (1960), reversing 164 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1958).
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prices, they too would be refused Parke, Davis products. Parke, Davis
informed the wholesalers and retailers that their competitors were receiv-
ing the same warning. Parke, Davis and the wholesalers in fact refused
to deal with several retailers who cut prices. One large retail chain
which had cut prices and was excluded from dealing in Parke, Davis
products was reinstated as a customer when Parke, Davis received assur-
ances of future compliance with its suggested minimum resale prices.
Parke, Davis influenced certain retailers to stop advertising its products at
cut rate prices by assuring them that their competitors would discontinue
similar advertising. Shortly thereafter, all retailers stopped the cut rate
price advertising and Parke, Davis and its wholesale distributors con-
tinued to sell drugs to the complying retailers. The government sought
an injunction alleging that Parke, Davis conspired and combined with
retail and wholesale druggists to maintain wholesale and retail prices of
its pharmaceutical products.69 The trial court dismissed the complaint,"
stating that Parke, Davis's conduct was sanctioned by the Colgate doc-
trine.7 The trial court concluded that from all the evidence it was
unable to find a combination, conspiracy or agreement, express or im-
plied, to fix resale prices between Parke, Davis and the wholesalers or
retailers.7" The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment
and remanded the case for entry of an appropriate judgment."'
Although the Parke, Davis conduct had not resulted in absolutely uni-
form prices, the Supreme Court held that it had gone beyond a mere
announcement of a refusal to deal in an attempt to fix resale prices and
had violated the Sherman Act. The Court recognized the philosophy of
Colgate, i.e., that an individual has a right to choose his own customers
and to announce in advance upon what terms he will deal with them, but
went on to state that this right must be balanced with the right of so-
ciety in preserving price competition.7 The district court, stated Mr.
Justice Brennan, "apparently assumed that the government could prevail
only by establishing a contractual arrangement, albeit implied, between
Parke, Davis and its customers."7  Citing the Beech-Nut and Bausch &
Lomb cases, the Supreme Court declared that a judicial inquiry into price-
69. See § 4 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
70. 164 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1958).
71. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
72. 164 F. Supp. at 835. The trial judge did not describe the standard he used in deter-
mining whether or not a combination or agreement to fix resale prices had existed. Since
the trial judge described Parke, Davis' conduct as "properly unilateral," it would seem to
be reasonable to assume that he did not find evidence of an agreement between Parke, Davis
and its wholesalers. 164 F. Supp. at 829. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court
under the Expediting Act. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
73. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
74. Id. at 43.
75. Ibid.
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fixing cases could be had without the necessity of finding evidence of an
agreement, express or implied, to fix resale prices when the defendant
had been charged with conspiring and combining to fix prices.7" The
Court then set out the test to be applied:
Thus, whether an unlawful combination or conspiracy is proved is to be
judged by what the parties actually did rather than by the words they
used.77
In applying the test to the actions of Parke, Davis the Court found:
In thus involving the wholesalers to stop the flow of Parke Davis pro-
ducts to the retailers, thereby inducing retailers' adherence to its sug-
gested retail prices, Parke Davis created a combination with the re-
tailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices and violated the Sherman
Ac. 78
The Court pointed out that the Sherman Act not only forbids contractual
agreements, but also combinations which restrain trade.79 Therefore,
according to the Parke, Davis decision, where a combination to fix resale
prices is alleged, between a manufacturer and wholesalers, it is not neces-
sary for the Court to find an agreement either express or implied."0 The
Court in the Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb cases went no further than
to infer an agreement through the cooperation and acquiescence of the
wholesalers and retailers in maintaining resale prices when coupled with
a threat of refusing to deal. In the Parke, Davis case, the possibility or
necessity of inferring an agreement to fix prices in violation of the Sher-
man Act, when resale prices were maintained, was discounted. The
Court found the unlawful act to be the combined action on the part of
the manufacturer and its wholesalers and retailers, plus a threat of a
refusal to deal for noncompliance, and the resulting suppression of trade.
What constituted the suppression of trade was not made explicit. Since
the finding of a suppression of trade is in itself a conclusion, the fact that
some of the retailers did maintain prices for fear of not receiving Parke,
Davis products could be the only element which constituted the sup-
pression of trade.
The majority also concluded that the suppression of advertising of the
cut rate prices by Parke, Davis and the retailers was also concerted action
resulting in a suppression of trade.
The dissent in Parke, Davis maintained that the existing case law
required a finding of some price-fixing agreement, express or implied, in
order to remove a manufacturer from the shield of the Colgate doctrine
76. Id. at 44.
77. Aid.
78. Id. at 45.
79. Ibid.
80. Id. at 44.
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despite the government's allegation of a combination to fix prices in
violation of the Sherman Act.8 It also pointed out that there could not
be a finding of concerted action on the part of Parke, Davis and its whole-
salers. In referring to the threats of refusing to deal which Parke, Davis
made to its wholesalers and retailers, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for
the dissenting justices stated:
I cannot see how such unilateral action, permissible in itself, be-
comes any less unilateral because it is taken simultaneously with
similar unilateral action .... 82
The majority, in finding that there existed concerted action on the
part of Parke, Davis and its wholesalers to exclude noncomplying re-
tailers from dealing in its products could have reached the same result
without modifying the prior case law concerning price-fixing agreements
and the right to refuse to deal. By acting in concert with wholesalers
in refusing to deal with noncomplying retailers, Parke, Davis and its
wholesalers effectively boycotted those retailers from trading in Parke,
Davis products. This was done in order to coerce the retailers into sell-
ing the Parke, Davis products at the suggested prices. This amounted to
a per se violation of the Sherman Act under the authority of the group
boycott cases."
Prior to the Parke, Davis case a manufacturer could proceed under
an announced plan of refusing to deal with all who did not comply
with his suggested resale prices and need only fear a finding of an im-
plied agreement to fix prices and thereby a violation of the Sherman
Act. Under the Parke, Davis ruling a manufacturer who proceeds upon
such a course may be charged with violating the Sherman Act due to
his actions alone, and not because such actions give rise to an inference
of an agreement to fix resale prices. This has the practical effect of eas-
ing the burden of proof on the government in cases where the govern-
ment alleges the existence of a combination to fix resale prices. The
government need only show that the concerted action of the manufacturer
and wholesalers resulted in the establishment of fixed resale prices, re-
gardless of any agreement, express or implied.
On the other hand, the Parke, Davis decision seems to be a step
toward the removal of a basic inconsistency concerning the effect of price
81. Id. at 49 (dissenting opinion). The dissent also argued that to overturn the lower
court's findings of fact, i.e., that no agreement to fix prices existed, would violate The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and prior case law concerning the rules since in fact the lower court
applied the proper legal standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 (a) (finding of fact to be set aside only
if clearly erroneous). The majority countered this argument by concluding that the trialjudge failed to apply the proper standard of law. The majority contended that a manu-
facturer could violate the Sherman Act due to the establishment of fixed resale prices without
the necessity of finding an agreement to fix prices. Id. at 43.
82. Id. at 55 (dissenting opinion).
83. Cases cited note 31 supra.
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fixing. Why should price fixing, which is a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act, be legal if accomplished solely through a refusal to deal? It
would be consistent to say that price fixing brought about by any means
is illegal. The Supreme Court, in allowing the Colgate doctrine to re-
main as a means to achieve fixed resale prices, had condoned an illegal
result because of the means used to achieve such a result, i.e., a refusal to
deal. In so doing, the Court had failed to follow its own mandate: that
the antitrust laws are concerned with economic realities, that they are
aimed at "substance rather than form.
' 84
CONCLUSION
As a result of the Parke, Davis decision manufacturers who do not
sell in states where fair trade laws are in effect and who wish to maintain
resale prices of their products must proceed with great caution. Where
a manufacturer deals through a distributorship sales program or through
wholesalers it would seem impossible for him to control the resale prices
of its product. In order to do so he would have to request that all whole-
salers refuse to sell to retailers who were selling his product at cut rate
prices. If the manufacturer actually stopped supplying those wholesalers
who did not comply with his request and other wholesalers actually did
comply, or all the wholesalers complied, the manufacturer may be charged
with acting in concert with the complying wholesalers to boycott the non-
complying retailers and wholesalers. Such concerted boycotting activity
is considered a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 5 Although the
manufacturer may intend to be exercising his right to choose whom he
will deal with and announce in advance the circumstances under which
he will refuse to deal and thereby fall within the protective graces of the
Colgate doctrine, he may be thwarted in his efforts by the Parke, Davis
case. Parke, Davis attempted to fall within the permissive Colgate
doctrine and was faced with the following contention by the govern-
ment, which contention the United States Supreme Court accepted.
[B]y entwining the wholesalers and retailers in a program to promote
general compliance with its price maintenance policy [Parke, Davis]
went beyond mere customer selection and created combinations or
conspiracies to enforce resale price maintentance in violation of § § 1 and
3 of the Sherman Act"86
Therefore, as to a manufacturer who does not deal directly with re-
tailers, a resale price maintenasce plan designed to fall within the Col-
gate doctrine becomes practically impossible without violating the Sher-
man Act since such a policy can only be enforced with the cooperation of
84. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).
85. Cases cited note 31 supra.
86. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1960).
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the wholesalers who serve the retailers. A recent federal circuit court
quite appropriately stated the effect the Parke, Davis decision had upon
the Colgate doctrine:
The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manu-
facturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric
simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enter-
prise.87
Where a manufacturer deals directly with retailers, a refusal to sell
to such retailers, if they resell at other than the suggested prices, is still
permissible in effectuating uniform resale prices.8" The Supreme Court
in the Parke, Davis case refused to overrule the Colgate doctrine 9 and
the doctrine has continued to be recognized by the lower federal courts in
cases after the Parke, Davis decision."0
ROBERT J. ROTATORI
87. George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1960). The complaint of plaintiff, in a suit for treble damages, alleged that the defendant,
the world's largest manufacturer of electrical power tools, for the purpose of fixing and con-
trolling minimum sales prices on bids to government agencies, had directed plaintiff and other
distributors of the defendant to adhere to the prices fixed by the defendant. It was further
alleged that to enforce compliance, defendant threatened loss of distributorships, elimination
of distributor discounts, surveillance of bids, boycotting of nonconformers, and had termi-
nated plaintiff's distributorship for failure to conform to defendant's fixed bid prices. The
court ruled that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to bring the complaint within
the Beech-Nut and Parke, Davis decisions.
A similar complaint was upheld in the case of Banana Distributors, Inc. v. United Fruit
Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 5 69,733 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). In this treble-damage suit the
plaintiff alleged that defendant and its sales subsidiary had monopolized and conspired to
monopolize and to restrain importation and distribution of bananas in the United States and
had abused their monopoly in various ways. The court noted that the gravamen of the
plaintiff's action involved refusal to sell, price fixing and an allocation system involving both
of the foregoing phases. Noting the warnings in Black & Decker, supra, that Colgate has
left "a narrow channel" of safe legal passage, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint. This is hardly surprising in view of the New York District Court's enumera-
tion of the various factors relevant to a trial on the merits to determine whether the defendants
"have passed through the narrow channel" left by Colgate. Neither this case nor Black &
Decker, however, is limited merely to an adjudication of a seller's suggested resale price policy.
See also Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959).
88. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960); Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959);
Weir v. Chicago Plastering Institute, 272 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1959); McElhenney Co., Inc. v.
Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 174 F. Supp. 802 (D.D.C. 1959); Orbo Theatre Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 156 F. Supp.
770 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943
(1959).
89. 362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960).
90. Banana Distributors, Inc. v. United Fruit Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 5 69,733 (S.D.
N.Y. 1960).
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